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Abstract
In a framework, where child labor results from a risky choice between working and school-
ing, we study the reason why public education expenditures may fail to reduce child labor.
We determine an optimal composition of social expenditures between education and health
which minimizes child labor for a given government’s budget. This is tested with panel data
over 81 developing countries. It is evidenced that the unbalanced structure of the social
spending favourable to education to the detriment of health often observed in the poor coun-
t r i e si si n e ﬃcient to reduce child labor. More generally, our statements shed light on the need
to reconsider the conventional wisdom viewing public health and education expenditures as
substitutes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
While achieving schooling for all by 2015 is one of the millenium development goals as deﬁned
by the United Nations, the International Labor Oﬃce (ILO) estimates that in 2000, 211 million
children aged 5 to 14 work full-time, 48 million of which living in subsaharan Africa, 127 million
others in the region Asia-Paciﬁc, 73 million of them being less than 10 years old (ILO (2002)).
Besides the issue of the ban of child labor (see Dessy and Pallage (2005)),1 it is henceforth crucial
to understand how the governments can act to reduce child labor through the social spending.
Special attention has to be paid to education expenditures, expected to impact directly child
labor through an increase in the education return. However, among others, Dessy and Pallage
(2005) enhance that public education has severely failed in increasing return to education, due to
“uneconomic policies”, while Schultz (1999) argues that education only beneﬁt to an elite in the
developping countries. Hence, public education expenditures would not provide the conditions
for strong decreases in child labor. We attempt here to develop a possible reason for these
“uneconomic policies”, depending on the share of each kind of social expenditures on the whole
social spending (social expenditures being resumed to education and health), arguing that due
to their complementarity, health and education expenditures have to be studied jointly.2
On the empirical ground, the distribution of public expenditures between education and
health in developing countries is much more favourable to the former as emphasized by Burgess
and Stern (1993).3 Actually, a structural diﬀerence between poor and rich countries seems to
emerge with regard to the relative weight of each kind of spending: the poorer the countries,
the more they invest on education related to health, which can be illustrated with Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
This structural diﬀerence may be linked to the age structure of the population: a younger (older)
population may invest relatively more in education (health) compared to health (education).
Even if deepening this analysis in order to highlight the causes of this structural diﬀerence would
1Moreover, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) writes (p. 200):
“If a more rapid reduction in the general incidence of child labor is a policy goal, improving educa-
tional systems and providing ﬁnancial incentives to poor families to send children to school may be
more useful solutions to the child labor problem than punitive measures designed to prevent children
from earning income.”
2Our approach falls under the child labor economic analysis (for a survey, see Basu (1999)), the studies of
public spending eﬃciency (in particular that of health and education) and the economic analysis of longevity
where child survival rate determines education and fertility choices (see Ehrlich and Lui (1991)).
3See their Table 1 and comments, p. 765-6.
2be of great interest, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we focus on the consequences
of this structural diﬀerence with regard to child labor, and not on the possible explanations of
that diﬀerence.
While education and health expenditures are often agregated as a composite social spending
in the literature (see for instance Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996)), assuming the same
impact for the both policies, we specify one transmission channel for each of them. A simple
theoretical model is developped, where child labor results from a household’s choice between
working and schooling. This household’s decision corresponds to a portefolio choice: child labor
is the riskless asset, child education the risky one. This choice depends both on the return and
on the risk of investing in education. The considered risk results here from the children death
or disease. Education spending is expected to increase the return on education (investment),
while health spending is supposed to reduce the risk of this investment by improving the health
status.
We deﬁne an optimal composition of social expenditures which minimizes child labor for
a given government’s budget. A complementarity between social expenditures is established.
The unbalanced structure of the social expenditures favourable to the education expenditures
in the poor countries seems therefore not to be consistent. These hypothesis are tested with
econometric panel data over 81 developing countries. More generally, our statements, which are
validated, shed light on the need to reconsider the conventional wisdom viewing public health
and education expenditures as substitutes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic assumptions of our analysis.
Section 3 studies the theoretical eﬀects of the two kinds of policy (health and education) on the
child labor. Section 4 provides some empirical validations. Section 5 summarizes the discussion
and oﬀers a few concluding comments.
2 Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework relies on Baland and Robinson (2000) and on Dessy and Pallage
(2001).4 Following Strulik (2004), we go further the former since we take into account the risk
in the parental decision to make the children work, including child mortality in the parental
decision of child labor. However, we enlarge Strulik (2004) analysis by emphasizing the eﬀects
of public health and education spending. Similarly to Chakraborty and Das (2005) who establish
4Given the available data, we do not develop an overlapping generations model.
3a positive relationship between parental health and children education, we set a link between
child mortality and child labor. But, while adult mortality is for Chakraborty and Das (2005) a
function of private health expenditures, child mortality is explained in our model by the public
health expenditures.
The optimization process concerns the child time allocation between working and schooling.5
Children own one unit of time which might be allocated to school (γ ∈ [0,1])o rt ow o r k( 1−γ).
This relevant choice is made by the parents since the children are supposed to be too young to
make rational (schooling) decisions (see Glomm (1997)). If we consider children as an asset6,
the child time allocation between working and schooling is a risky investment for the household.
The parental choice is then a portfolio decision, between a riskless investment (child labor) and
a risky but more proﬁtable one (schooling). However, we do not consider here the eﬀects of
credit constraints and ﬁnancial market imperfections on child labor, while they are one of most
important explaining factors according to Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005). The considered risk
does not result here from crop losses or from household heads unemployment, but from the child
survival.
We consider a two-period economy (t =1 ,2) with one single consumption good. There is no
discount of the future by the agents. At the ﬁrst period, the household consists of one working
adult, the parent (p), and of one child (c); at the second period, there are two adults (p and
a), each of them controlling his own income. Following Baland and Robinson (2000) or Dessy
and Pallage (2001), we assume separable preferences, denoted U(.), a normalization to zero of
child consumption and some altruism from parents to their children (one-side altruism). We
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where U and Wc are strictly increasing and concave functions. The parameter δ is the degree
of altruism, which induces the intergenerational link. The parameter φ is the child survival
probability or the education investment level of risk.7 Contrary to Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), this
5The fertility rate is assumed exogeneous.
6Dasgupta (1995) argues that "in poor countries children are also useful as income-earning assets." (p. 1895)
7Chakraborty (2004) and Chakraborty and Das (2005) also consider individual health status as an explanatory
factor of the discount rate.
4probability is certain and known. Its increase is equivalent to a decrease in the education
investment degree of risk. In the next section, this parameter (φ)w i l lb ed e t e r m i n e db yt h e
public health expenditures.
In the lack of saving and borrowing, consumption equalizes the available income at each
period. At the ﬁrst one, the household’s income corresponds to the sum of the parental wage,
denoted w, and of the child(ren) earning, (1 − γ)wc, which is the child’s time spent at work
(1 − γ) valued at the child’s wage rate (wc). At the second period, parents still earn w.8 The
remunerations of the children when adults depend on their educational level: a working child
will earn the same wage as his parents (w), while an educated child will be a skilled worker,
whom wage is denoted ws. It yields:
c1
p ≡ w +( 1− γ)wc,c 2
p ≡ w, cc ≡ (1 − γ)w + γws. (2)
We focus now on the labor demand side. We ignore the depreciating eﬀect of the child labor
on the parental wage as analysed by Basu and Van (1998). We assume a perfect competition
between ﬁrms, which induces an equalization of the wages to the marginal productivity of the
diﬀerent kind of workers. More precisely, we consider that the child productivity is a fraction
d (d<1) of the parent productivity. The skilled worker, i.e. the former educated child, has a
productivity that increases with the level of education, denoted e, which will be explained by
the public education expenditures in the next section. Hence, these labor market conditions
involve:
wc = dw, wa = ew. (3)




Wp (w +( 1− γ)dw,w,W c ((1 − γ)w + γew)).
If an interior solution exists, the First Order Condition (FOC) is equivalent to:9
−dU0 ((1 + d − dγ∗)w)+φδ (e − 1)W0
c ((1 − γ∗ + γ∗e)w)=0 ,
8The assumption that parent are still working at the second stage has no impact on the equilibrium child
labor’s level. Alternatives would be to suppose that parent died or does not work anymore at the second period.
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5which is equivalent to:










≡ f (γ∗;.). (4)
w h e r ew ed e n o t ec∗
c ≡ (1 − γ∗ + γ∗e)w and c1∗
p ≡ (1 + (1 − γ∗)d)w. The equilibrium level of
child schooling time (γ∗) equalizes the intertemporal consumption Marginal Rate of Substitution
(MRS) to the net return of education. Indeed, even without any private cost of education,
educating children remains costly for the parents, since the child time is valuable on labor
market (see Rosenzweig (1990)).
By inspection of (4) it is immediate that
∂f(γ∗;.)
∂γ∗ > 0.10 W em i g h ta l s oh a v et w oc o r n e r
solutions. There is no school (γ∗ =0 ) if and only if:
∀γ ∈ [0,1],f (γ;.) >
φδ (e − 1)
d
⇔ f (0;.)=













Similarly, there is no child labor (γ∗ =1 ) if and only if:
∀γ ∈ [0,1],f (γ;.) <
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There is no child labor (respectively no education) when the child wage, wc, or child productivity,
d, (respectively the wage of skilled workers, ws, or the the return to education, e)i ss u ﬃciently
low. Consider the partial inverse of f (.) with respect to γ∗,w h i c hw es h a l ld e n o t eb yψ,w h e r e
ψ(f (γ∗;w,d,e);w,d,e)=γ∗.W et h e nh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gProposition:





















An implicit assumption has been set here: when the parents choose the schooling time of
their children, they do not integrate the inﬂuence of this decision on the future wage of the

































6given at the decentralized equilibrium (contrary to Basu and Van (1998)).
3 Public intervention and optimal policy
In this section, we focus on two kinds of public incentives wich may impact negatively the child
labor: public education and public health expenditures (respectively denoted E and H). We
develop a speciﬁc mecanism for each policy: public education spending increases the return of
investment in education, while health spending reduces the risk of this investment by improving
the health status. However, the government’s balanced budget constraint involves a relationship
between the two kinds of public expenditures. We ﬁrst present the eﬀect of each public spending
on child labor. Then, we develop the consequences of taxation on our results.
According to the literature, the impact of public health spending (H) on health outcome is
questionable. The following studies, proxying health status by infant or child mortality, result
in diﬀerent appreciation of this impact. On one hand, Anand and Ravallion (1993) show a
positive impact.11 On the other hand, Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (2000) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
impact of public spending on health status on a cross-section over 100 countries. Finally, Bidani
and Ravallion (1997) as well as Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson (2001) emphasize a positive
impact on health care of the poor, while they ﬁnd a non signiﬁcant impact on the aggregate
health status. In our approach, we resume public health spending (H) by its impact on the
child survival rate (φ). Contrary to Strulik (2004), Chakraborty (2004) or Chakraborty and Das
(2005), we consider public rather than private health expenditures. More formally, we pose:12
φ ≡ φ(H),φ (0) = 0, lim
H−→∞
φ(H)=1 ,φ 0 (H) > 0 and φ00 (H) < 0. (6)
Even if substantial private resources are spent on education, the private share of educational
expenditure is much smaller than the public one in virtually all countries (see Psacharopoulos
and Woodhall (1986) or Glomm (1997)). Thus, we consider here the public education spending,
denoted E, as the only mean to increase the education return and we assume that this spending
increases the skilled workers’ wage at the second period. If there is no public expenditure, then
11However, the econometric validation of this study relies on only 22 observations.
12Following Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson (2001), we assume the concavity of φ(.): the impact of public
health on labor child that runs through the health status will be all the stronger as health status (child survival)
is low.
7education does not improve the wages. It yields:
e ≡ e(E),e (0) = 1,e 0 (E) > 0 and e00 (E) < 0. (7)
For a given child survival rate, the higher the education return is, the bigger the incentive to
choose schooling will be. For instance, Rosenzweig (1990) considers how exogenous changes in
t h er a t eo fr e t u r nt os c h o o l i n gi n ﬂue on the schooling investment decisions.
We consider now the government’s revenues. Following Barro (1990), most of the authors
studying the impact of the public spending on economic growth assume that the government
expenditures are ﬁnanced contemporaneously by a proportional income tax.13 We then assume
that the budget is balanced on the ﬁrst period, i.e. that at this period, the total collected tax
equalizes the public spending. For convenience, we consider a per capita tax (more accurately,
a tax per household), denoted T.14 The budget constraint is then given by: T = E + H.T h e
household’s objective function becomes:
W (γ,E,H,T;w,d)=U ((1 + d − γd)w − T)+U (w)+δφ(H)Wc ((1 − γ + γe(E))w).
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13See for instance Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) concerning the public expenditures, Glomm (1997) in
the case of public education regime or Chakraborty (2004) for the public health expenditures.
14Moreover, income tax can not be considered as the representative tax of the ﬁscal system in developing
countries (see Burgess and Stern (1993) or Chambas (2004)). According to Alm and Wallace (2004), it seems
"unlikely" that these countries are able to manage a broad-based individual income tax.
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We focus now on the government behavior whose goal is to raise the schooling investment
(γT∗). We do not consider the coordination failures nor the time inconstency in the relationship
between the government and the households. We denote α, the share of the tax ressources
allocated to education: E = αT and H =( 1− α)T.W ed e ﬁne γT∗ (α,T) the solution (10) with
regard to α and T. Given the tax pressure (T), the optimal composition of public expenditures,




The following Proposition resumes our results:
Proposition 2 Under a condition on the prudential attitude of household, there exists an op-
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in (10) is given by a ﬁrst
order Taylor expansion of (9) with respect to γ at γ∗T:
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Substituting E and H by their expression in terms of α and T, it yields:
γT∗ (α,T)=




φ(αT)δ (e((1 − α)T) − 1)
2 W00
c (w)+d2U00 ((1 + d)w)
i. (13)
In order to be more conclusive, we specify our utility functions (U (.) and W (.))i nv a r i o u sf o r m s
from four diﬀerent assumptions on the risk aversion. We obtain then the following ﬁgure with
four speciﬁc functional forms (logarithmic, CRRA, CARA and HARA).
Insert Figure 2 here
9Figure 2 shows how the optimal investment in education (γT∗ (α,T)) varies depending to the
composition of public expenditures (α ∈ [0,1])f o rd i ﬀerent levels of tax pressure (T). The
parents optimal choice (γ∗ (α,T)) is initially increasing and then decreasing, whatever the form
of the utility function is. We deduce that an increase in the education expenditures, for a given
budget (T)w i l lo n l yb ee ﬃcient on the left side of the curve, i.e. when the ratio education
expenditures related to the social expenditures is below a certain threshold. On the contrary,
beyond this certain threshold any additional public education expenditures that increases the
ratio is ineﬃcient.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the parental risk aversion on γ∗ (α,T), depending on both
the level of tax pressure and the distribution of the social expenditures.
Insert Figure 3 here
Even if trivial, given the assumptions of our model, this ﬁgure highlights the crucial role of
t h ep a r e n t a lr i s ka v e r s i o nt os e n dt h e i rc h i l d r e nt os c h o o l .A taﬁxed ﬁscal burden, we observe
that a household whom the absolute risk aversion, denoted (σ)i sl e s st h a naﬁrst threshold,
denoted σ1, reduces child labor as the share of the public education expenditure increases:
γ∗ (0.1,T) > γ∗ (0.5,T) > γ∗ (0.9,T). When the coeﬃcient σ belongs to the interval [σ1,σ2],
the relationship between the public education spending and children education is no monotonic
(indeed, we have: γ∗ (0.5,T) > max{γ∗ (0.9,T),γ∗ (0.1,T)}). Finally, if the household is more
risk averse (σ>σ 2), then an increase of the public education expenditure at the detriment
of the public health spending involves paradoxically an increase in child labor: γ∗ (0.9,T) >
γ∗ (0.5,T) > γ∗ (0.1,T).
4E c o n o m e t r i c v a l i d a t i o n
The following table presents the correspondance of theoretical and empirical symbols.
Insert Table 1 here
Our estimates rely on panel data over 81 developing countries for three averaged 5 year periods
(1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000). The ﬁrst assumption to be tested is the way the trade-oﬀ
between working and schooling is impacted by the education investment level of risk, proxied
by the health status and measured by the child survival rate: any increase in the latter modiﬁes
10the trade-oﬀ in favour of schooling by decreasing the level of the risk.16 T h ei m p a c to fp u b l i c
interventions in health and education sectors will then be tested (see regressions 15 in Table
3). We will then estimate the theoretical non-linear relationship, presented Figure 2, between
child labor and the share of public education expenditures related to the social (health and
education) expenditures. We show that if public education expenditures often fail in decreasing
signiﬁcantly child labor, it is because the share of public education expenditures related to social
expenditures is too high.
4.1 Trade-oﬀ working versus schooling and the level of risk
The child labor results from a trade-oﬀ between schooling and working. It is measured as the
ratio of the children part of the active population aged between 10 and 14 related to the total
children aged between 10 and 14. Any increase (decrease) in that ratio reﬂects a move in the
trade-oﬀ towards working (schooling). The basic assumption of our model is that this trade-
oﬀ i sn e g a t i v e l yi m p a c t e db yt h ee d u c a t i o ni n v e s t m e n tl e v e lo fr i s kw h i c hi sp r o x i e db yh e a l t h
status. Following the literature on macroeconomic and health, the health status is proxied by
the under-ﬁve survival rate.17 We use a logistic transformation of the child survival rate since
it seems more adapted than the log-log speciﬁcation to bounded indicator of development such
as survival, literacy, etc (see Franses and Hobijn (2001), Grigoriou and Guillaumont (2003)).
We test the following equation:
lcit = α0 + α1.yit + α2.csrit + ηi + εit, (14)
where lcit is the logarithm of the part of the children aged between 10 and 14 working; yit is the
logarithm of the per capita GDP (in 1995 dollars); csrit is the logit transformation of the child
survival rate, ηi the ﬁxed eﬀect, εit the error term.
Insert Table 2 here
Once controlled for the per capita GDP, the impact of which is signiﬁcant and with the expected
negative sign, and for the country speciﬁce ﬀect, any increase in the health status, proxied by
16Av a r i a b l er e ﬂecting the human capital stock, namely the adult literacy rate has been tested. This variable
appeared to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on labor child while other results remained unchanged. However,
since this variable doesn’t appear in our theoretical model, we did not present this result.
17See for instance the Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001, World Health Organi-
sation (2001).
11the logistic transformation of child survival, has a strong signiﬁcant negative impact on child
labor (14). This result validates our assumption that any change in the degree of risk, proxied
by the child survival rate, implies a move in the trade-oﬀ between schooling and working. Child
survival will be thereafter reﬂecting the education investment level of risk.
4.2 Trade-oﬀ working versus schooling, education investment level of risk
and public intervention
We ﬁrst test the impact of health and education public expenditures on child labor. It will then
be evidenced that not only the level of each kind of expenditures (to impact child labor) but
also their distribution matter.
4.2.1 The education and health expenditures model
Since we have assumed that health expenditures impact child labor through a decrease in the
education investment degree of risk, health expenditures is not only included additively (heit) but
also interacted with the variable csrit. Hence, the impact of health expenditures on child labor
will be all the stronger as the education investment degree of risk (child survival rate) will be high
(low). Then we add the public health expenditures, the impact of which is expected negative.
However, given the litterature, a non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient would not be very surprising.
The following model is to be tested:
lcit = α0 + α1.yit + α2.csrit + α3.heit + α4.heit.csrit + α5.eeit + ηi + εit, (15)
where heit and eeit are respectively the logarithm of the public health expenditures and the
logarithm of the public education expenditures both expressed in percent of GDP, ηi is the ﬁxed
eﬀect and εit is the error term. We expect the following signs:
α1 < 0,α 2 < 0,α 3 < 0,α 4 > 0,α 5 < 0.
We obtain the following results:
Insert Table 3 here
Beyond their impact through child survival, health expenditures have a signiﬁcant negative
impact on child labor, but as expected, to a decreasing extent (regression 15 in table 3). This
result is robust to the introduction of education expenditures. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient
12associated to education expenditures is not signiﬁcant: public education expenditures do not
ensure a decrease in child labor. This empirical ﬁnding joins our theoretical framework, according
to which not only the level of the education spending matters, but also the share of education
expenditures related to the social spendings.
4.2.2 The education to social expenditures ratio model
In order to test whether or not the countries of our sample are on the right side of the curve
(Fig.2), the variable child labor is to be regressed both on the ratio education expenditures
related to education and health expenditures (shareit) and on that squared ratio (sqshareit),
just controlling for the income per capita (yit), for the level of social expenditures related to the
GDP (Tit) and for the country speciﬁce ﬀect.
The following model is to be tested:
lcit = α0 + α1.yit + α2.share + α3.sqshareit + ηi + εit. (16)
Four situations can occur depending on the sign of α2 and α3.
(i) α2 and α3 are both negative: ceteris paribus, any increase in the public education expen-
d i t u r e si sa l w a y se ﬃcient to reduce child labor, and will be all the more eﬃcient as the share of
education expenditures related to education and health ones is high. This corresponds to the
left side of the curve (Fig. 3) where massive inves t m e n t si ne d u c a t i o n( r e l a t e dt oh e a l t h )s h o u l d
result in a strong decrease in child labor.
(ii) α2 > 0 and α3 < 0: all other things being equal, any increase in the education to social
expenditures ratio will ﬁrst (for the low value of the ratio) be ineﬃcient to decrease child labor
but beyond a certain threshold it will become increasingly eﬃcient. This would correspond to an
inverted U-shaped curve, which is at the opposite of the assumptions of our theoretical model.
(iii) α2 < 0 and α3 > 0: all other things being equal, any increase in the education to social
expenditures ratio will ﬁrst (for the low value of the ratio) be eﬃcient to decrease child labor
(left side of the curve) but beyond a certain threshold it will become increasingly ineﬃcient.
This would correspond to the U-curve following our theoretical model. It means that beyond
a certain threshold, the education investment has to be accompanied by health investments in
order to beneﬁt from the complementarities of these two public goods.
(iv) α2 and α3 both positive: all other things being equal, any increase in the public education
e x p e n d i t u r e si sa l w a y si n e ﬃcient to reduce child labor. This corresponds to the right side of
13the curve (Fig. 2) where education expenditures should be accompanied by massive investment
in health: decreasing the investment education level of risk, health investments would ensure a
context more favorable to education investment.
Insert Table 4 here
Estimate of equation (16) results in α2 and α3 both positive and signiﬁcant. This implies that
our developing countries sample is on average on the right side of the curve. We are then able
to provide an explanation to the ineﬀectiveness of public education expenditures with regard
to the child labor decrease: it is not only the level of education expenditures that matters, but
also the share of education expenditures in social spending. Beyond a certain threshold, it is
useless to increase education expenditures when this is not accompanied by health expenditures
that will ensure a decrease in the risk of the investment in education, implying a context more
favorable to education investments (from the parents).
4.3 Econometric discussion
4.3.1 Fixed eﬀect estimate and serial correlation
The use of panel data econometrics with the introduction of country speciﬁce ﬀects (ηi)a l l o w s
us to control for unobservable constant heterogeneity between these countries. Moreover, while
it is often assumed that most of the observed serial correlation is dominated by the presence of
this country speciﬁce ﬀect in the composite errors uit = ηi +εit, (the potential serial correlation
being then eliminated by the within transformation), Wooldridge (2002) highlights that there
can be serial dependence in the residual term εit,t h eﬁxed eﬀect standard errors being in that
case very misleading. Following Drukker (2003), we specify Newey-West standard errors for ﬁxed
eﬀect model to face any potential problem of serial correlation that would bias the inference: it
corrects both the heteroskedastic and the autocorrelated structure of the error.
4.3.2 Reverse causality
One could argue that explaining child labor by education expenditures may induce a reverse
causality leading to an endogeneity bias since the level of education expenditures is likely to be
all the higher (lower) as child labor is rare (important). However it seems obvious that in the
context of developing countries, i.e. in scarcity economies, and moreover on social questions as
education and health are, the causality goes from the supply side and not from the demand one.
145 Political implications and concluding remarks
This paper analyses the eﬀects of education and health expenditures on child labor. The house-
hold’s choice to have their child(ren) working or schooling can be viewed as a risky choice,
education being in that case a risky investment. In this framework, each type of public spending
inﬂues on the individual trade-oﬀ through a particular way: the education spending increases
the return of education, while the health spending reduces the risk of education investment. Our
theoretical model emphasizes that these expenditures can not be considered systematically as
substitute, what is validated by the empirical ﬁndings. This is all the more crucial as following
the MDGs governments aim at achieving shooling for all by 2015.
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where SOC is the denominator corresponds to the Second Order Condition of (8). The solution
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where A(.) denotes the Arrow-Pratt abolute risk aversion measure.18 We denote Q(α) the
numerator of the expression in equation (18).
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18Indeed, since the child is not a decision maker (he is considered as too young to choose to invest in schooling),
we express our conditions in term of parental risk aversion with respect to the children consumption at the second
period, denoted A(c
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Since by deﬁnition A(c∗
c) > 0, it is immediate that e0 (.)φ(.)−φ0 (.)(e(.) − 1) > 0.M o r e o v e r , w e
denote P (c∗







c) . The SOC of (17) is then















Algeria; Argentina; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil;
Burkina Faso; Cambodia; Cameroon; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Cote d’Ivoire;
Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Guatemala; Honduras;
India; Iran Islamic Rep.; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Kuwait; Lesotho; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali;
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Nicaragua;
Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; South
Africa; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia;
Turkey; United Arab Emirates; Venezuela RB; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
B Figures and tables
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Figure 1: Data come from the World Bank (2004), the variables are expressed in logs













































Figure 2: Optimal level of education investment (γ (α,T)) with the following speciﬁcations: δ =0 .6, d =0 .3, w =3 0 , φ(H)=1− 1
1+3H,
e(E)=1+E0.8, U (.)=W (.),a n dC A R A :U (x)=−e−σx
σ with σ =0 .014, CRRA: U (x)=x1−R
1−R with R =0 .4,H A R A :
U (x)= 1−k
A(2−k) (Ax + B)
2−k








Figure 3: Optimal level of education investment (γ (α,T)) depending on the coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion (σ) in case of CARA utility function, with the following speciﬁcations:
U (.)=W (.),U(x)=−e−σx








1 − γ lc Child Labor
w y Income
φ csr Child Survival Rate
H he Health Public Expenditures
E ee School Public Expenditures
α share Share of Education in Social Expenditures
T T Social Expenditures
Table 1: Corresponding Symbols of the Variables














p-values are indicated under the coeﬃcients
Table 2: Child Labor, Child Survival and Preference for Present (Within Estimator with Newey-
West Robust Standard Errors)























p-values are indicated under the coeﬃcients
Table 3: Child Labor, Child Survival and Social Expenditure (Within Estimator with Newey-
West robust standard errors)




















p-values are indicated under the coeﬃcients
Table 4: Child Labor, Health and Education Expenditures, the Share Matters (Within Estimator
with Newey-West Robust Standard Errors)
Variable Deﬁnition Source of the data
lcit
Part of the children aged 10-14
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Table 5: Deﬁnition and Source of the Data
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